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Maritime Magic: How Cruise Lines Can
Avoid State Law Compliance Through
Passenger Contracts
CAMERON CHUBACK *
Florida Statutes section 381.00316 prohibits businesses
in Florida from requiring consumers to provide documentary proof of COVID-19 vaccination to access businesses’
goods and services. Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings
(“NCLH”) has recently challenged section 381.00316’s applicability to its cruise operations because NCLH believes
that requiring its passengers to provide documentary proof
of COVID-19 vaccination is the one constant that allows
NCLH’s cruise ships to smoothly access foreign ports, which
have differing COVID-19 protocols and rules. In Norwegian
Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor
of NCLH on this challenge, stating that section 381.00316
violated NCLH’s First Amendment rights and the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This decision is
now on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.
This Comment argues that NCLH could have brought
another claim to deflect section 381.00316’s applicability to
NCLH’s cruise operations: a claim of admiralty jurisdiction.
A claim of admiralty jurisdiction would have likely led the
court to determine that NCLH’s passenger ticket contract,
which contains provisions that require passengers to provide documentary proof of COVID-19 vaccination before
*
Staff Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Volume 76; Eleventh Circuit Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Volume 75. University of Miami
School of Law, J.D., cum laude, 2022. Miami Herbert Business School, MBA,
Valedictorian, 2021. New York University, B.A., cum laude, 2018.
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boarding NCLH’s ships, is a maritime contract that is subject only to federal maritime law and not Florida state law.
Thus, section 381.00316 cannot prohibit NCLH’s requirement of passengers’ documentary proof of COVID-19 vaccination. This Comment discusses the value of bringing an
admiralty jurisdiction claim in this context, and highlights
how businesses that create and enter maritime contracts,
particularly other cruise lines conducting cruises out of
Florida, can take advantage of an admiralty jurisdiction
claim to avoid compliance with state laws that burden their
operations.
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INTRODUCTION
Many businesses have altered their operations in an effort to
function optimally in a world that has still not fully emerged from
the COVID-19 pandemic. 1 One such business is Norwegian Cruise
Line Holdings, Ltd. (“NCLH”), the parent company of the famous
Norwegian Cruise Line, whose cruise ships travel to destinations all
over the world. 2 With government restrictions on the cruise industry
easing in recent times, 3 NCLH, recognizing the unique risks in viral
transmission aboard cruise ships, amended its passenger ticket contract to require all passengers to show proof of COVID-19 vaccination before boarding its ships. 4 This operational alteration was
meant to facilitate smooth access to global ports and to ensure that
NCLH’s cruises were maximally safe for passengers, crew, and the
communities where NCLH’s ships visit. 5
However, Florida Statutes section 381.00316, has thrown a legal
wrench in NCLH’s plan for fully vaccinated cruises. 6 The statute
prohibits all businesses operating in Florida from requiring consumers to show proof of COVID-19 vaccination to access businesses’
goods or services. 7 On its face, this statute appears to prohibit NCLH
from requiring its passengers to show proof of COVID-19 vaccination before boarding its ships. 8 To challenge this prohibition, NCLH
sued the Surgeon General of Florida in Norwegian Cruise Line
Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 9 now on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, 10
Sharon Stang, Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Businesses and Employees by Industry, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jul. 2021), https://
www.bls.gov/spotlight/2021/impact-of-the-coronavirus-pandemic-on-business
es-and-employees-by-industry/home.htm.
2
About, NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS LTD., https://www.nclh
ltd.com/about (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
3
See infra notes 28–44.
4
See infra notes 20, 46.
5
See infra notes 46, 82.
6
See Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d
1143, 1148 (S.D. Fla. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug. 11,
2021).
7
FLA. STAT. § 381.00316(1) (2021).
8
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1148.
9
Id. at 1147–48.
10
Civil Appeal Statement, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. State
Surgeon Gen., No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2021).
1
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to enjoin section 381.00316’s governance of NCLH’s vaccine documentation requirement. 11 Judge Williams of the Southern District
of Florida agreed with NCLH’s mostly constitutional claims and
consequently enjoined section 381.00316’s governance of NCLH’s
vaccine documentation requirement. 12
One claim notably absent from NCLH’s complaint and Judge
Williams’ order was a claim of admiralty jurisdiction. 13 NCLH’s requirement of proof of COVID-19 vaccination was embodied in its
passenger contracts, 14 which are maritime contracts. 15 Because federal law, and not state law, generally governs maritime contracts, 16
NCLH could have asserted admiralty jurisdiction and on that basis
enforced the contract, which in effect would have exempted NCLH
from section 381.00316’s prohibition on requiring proof of COVID19 vaccination. 17
Part I of this Comment provides background information on Rivkees, including the series of events that led to NCLH’s complaint
and the claims NCLH made. Part I also summarizes the law concerning the most pertinent question following an admiralty jurisdiction claim in a case involving a maritime contract: whether federal
maritime law or state law governs the maritime contract. Part II analyzes whether NCLH could have won on an admiralty jurisdiction
claim. Part II also compares an admiralty jurisdiction claim with a
dormant Commerce Clause claim, a functionally similar claim that

See infra note 53.
See infra notes 87, 120.
13
See infra note 201. The opening paragraph of Section II.A defines “admiralty jurisdiction claim” as used in this Comment. See infra Section II.A. Also,
this Comment uses the terms “admiralty” and “maritime” interchangeably to refer
to the body of law “that covers all contracts, torts, injuries or offenses that take
place on navigable waters.” See Balaschak v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No.
09-21196-CIV, 2009 WL 8659594, at *2 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2009) (citing 1
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1–1 (4th ed.
2004)); see also What Is Admiralty Law?, FINDLAW, https://www.findlaw.com/
hirealawyer/choosing-the-right-lawyer/admiralty-law.html (last updated Oct. 8,
2020).
14
See infra note 121.
15
See infra note 205.
16
See infra note 125.
17
See infra Section II.A.
11
12
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NCLH successfully brought, 18 and analyzes whether bringing an admiralty jurisdiction claim is worthwhile given the similarity between
the two claims.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.
Origins of Rivkees
In March 2020, businesses began to shut down all around the
world as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. 19 Cruise lines were no
exception, especially because of the unique environment aboard
cruise ships: close quarters for living, dining, and entertainment,
generally indoors, facilitates much person-to-person contact and
thereby creates a heightened risk of viral transmission. 20 Outbreaks
of COVID-19 on cruises that set sail at the beginning of the pandemic showed the realization of this risk. 21 On the Diamond Princess, 712 of the 3,711 people onboard were infected with COVID19, and nine people died. 22 During two voyages of the Grand Princess, 159 people were infected with COVID-19, and eight people
died. 23
Acknowledging the increased risk of COVID-19 outbreak
aboard their ships, “NCLH and other members of the Cruise Line
International Association (‘CLIA’) voluntarily suspended all cruise
ship operations for thirty days.” 24 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (“CDC”) began regulating the cruise industry at this
point as well. 25 The CDC’s first cruise-related regulation was its No
Sail Order (“NSO”) issued on March 24, 2020, 26 “which prohibited
cruise ship operators from continuing operations unless approved by
See infra Section II.B.
See Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d
1143, 1148 (S.D. Fla. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug. 11,
2021).
20
See id. at 1151 (citing No Sail Order and Suspension of Further Embarkation, 85 Fed. Reg. 16628, 16629–30 (Mar. 24, 2020) [hereinafter No Sail Order]).
21
See id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
No Sail Order, supra note 20.
18
19
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the U.S. Coast Guard in consultation with the CDC.” 27 After the
NSO expired on October 31, 2020, the CDC issued its Conditional
Sailing Order (“CSO”) on November 4, 2020, 28 “which established
a four-step framework for a phased resumption of cruise ship passenger operations.” 29 Criticism of the CSO’s framework arose because it “lacked sufficient implementing instructions” and was burdensome, which increased the likelihood that cruise ships would not
sail in 2021. 30 The most burdensome step of the CSO framework
was the second step: “performing simulated voyages designed to test
a cruise ship operators’ [sic] ability to mitigate COVID-19 on cruise
ships.” 31 To try to alleviate the burden for the cruise lines, the CDC
stated, in a “Dear Colleague” letter on April 28, 2021 and a set of
technical instructions issued on May 14, 2021, that instead of performing simulated voyages, cruise lines could satisfy step two of the
CSO framework by attesting that ninety-five percent of crew and
passengers were vaccinated for COVID-19 (“Attestation
Method”). 32 The CDC subsequently issued an operation manual on
May 26, 2021, “setting forth mandatory COVID-19 protocols for
simulated and restricted passenger voyages,” and “more lenient, alternative operational possibilities for ships with” at least ninety-five
percent of crew and passengers vaccinated. 33
Nevertheless, Florida determined that the CSO framework, especially its second step, “would delay the reopening of the cruise
industry,” 34 which would have the effect of “crippling the industry
and causing the state to lose hundreds of millions of dollars.” 35 Florida consequently sued the CDC in the Middle District of Florida in

Rivkees, F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
Framework for Conditional Sailing and Initial Phase COVID-19 Testing
Requirements for Protection of Crew, 85 Fed. Reg. 70153 (Nov. 4, 2020).
29
Rivkees, F. Supp. 3d at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30
See id. at 1152.
31
See id. at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
Id. at 1152.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See Michael Levenson, Judge Blocks C.D.C. from Enforcing Virus Rules
for Cruise Ships in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/18/us/cdc-covid-cruises.html.
27
28
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State v. Becerra, 36 “seeking to strike down the CSO and its subsequent instructions.” 37 The Middle District of Florida granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the CDC from enforcing the CSO
and its subsequent instructions on cruise lines operating cruises in
Florida. 38 The Middle District of Florida’s support for its preliminary injunction included the following: (1) Florida was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that the CSO and its subsequent instructions “exceed the authority delegated to [the] CDC under
[United Stated Code, Title 42,] Section 264(a);” 39 (2) Florida would
suffer irreparable harm in the form of continued lost state revenue
from the lack of cruise operations in Florida or even potential abandonment of Florida’s ports by the cruise lines as a result of the continued imposition of the CSO and its subsequent instructions; 40 (3)
“COVID-19 no longer threatens the public’s health to the same extent presented at the start of the pandemic or when [the] CDC issued
the [CSO]” as to justify the continued imposition of the CSO and its
subsequent instructions; 41 and (4) it is in the public interest of Florida for Florida’s local economy to be healthy, which requires a
healthy cruise industry––something that cannot be achieved with
continued imposition of the CSO and its subsequent instructions. 42
Moreover, the Middle District of Florida ordered that the CSO be
stayed in Florida until July 18, 2021, at which point the CSO and its
subsequent instructions would become “non-binding” guidelines.43
The Eleventh Circuit later denied the CDC’s request for a stay of the
injunction pending resolution of its appeal of the district court’s order. 44
Despite the Middle District of Florida’s ruling, all cruise lines
operating in Florida have agreed to voluntarily continue following
544 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. State
v. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., No. 21-12243 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022).
37
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1152.
38
Id.; Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1304–05.
39
Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1304–05.
40
See id. at 1299–1305.
41
See id. at 1303–04.
42
See id. at 1304 (citing All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127,
1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The effect on the health of the local economy is a proper
consideration in the public interest analysis.”)).
43
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1152.
44
Id. at 1152–53.
36
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the CSO and its subsequent instructions. 45 Indeed, NCLH implemented a policy of requiring 100% of crew and passengers to be
vaccinated for COVID-19, and all passengers must show proof of
such vaccination before boarding. 46 This policy was intended “to
prevent a COVID-19 outbreak onboard, build brand trust and goodwill with customers, ensure compliance with the attestation [NCLH]
submitted to the CDC, and take advantage of the leniency afforded
cruise ships with 95 percent vaccinated passengers and crew under
the CDC’s Operation Manual.” 47
However, Florida Statutes section 381.00316, enacted on July 1,
2021, 48 essentially impeded NCLH’s plan for fully vaccinated
cruises. Section 381.00316 states:
A business entity, as defined in s. 768.38 to include
any business operating in this state, may not require
patrons or customers to provide any documentation
certifying COVID-19 vaccination or postinfection
recovery to gain access to, entry upon, or service
from the business operations in this state. This subsection does not otherwise restrict businesses from
instituting screening protocols consistent with authoritative or controlling government-issued guidance to protect public health. 49
Put simply, section 381.00316 prohibits businesses from requiring patrons to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination to access
businesses’ goods and services. 50 Furthermore, section 381.00316
punishes businesses for each violation with a fine of up to $5,000.51
This statute, on its face, prohibits NCLH’s plan for fully vaccinated
cruises, which NCLH claimed would seriously harm its interstate

45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 381.00316(1) (2021).
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 381.00316(4) (2021).

4]

MARITIME MAGIC

1045

and foreign cruise operations amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 52 Therefore, on July 13, 2021, NCLH sued Dr. Scott Rivkees, the Surgeon General of Florida and the head of the Florida
Department of Health, in the Southern District of Florida seeking to
enjoin section 381.00316’s applicability to NCLH’s proof of
COVID-19 vaccination requirement. 53
B.
Rivkees: Claims, Defenses, and Rulings
NCLH’s complaint in Rivkees asked for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Surgeon General of Florida so that section
381.00316 could not be enforced against NCLH. 54 NCLH made four
claims in favor of its request for injunction: (1) federal preemption,
(2) violation of First Amendment free speech, (3) violation of the
dormant Commerce Clause, and (4) violation of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. 55 The dormant Commerce Clause
claim will be discussed last and in the most detail because it greatly
resembles an admiralty jurisdiction claim, the centerpiece of this
Comment’s analysis. 56
1. FEDERAL PREEMPTION CLAIM
In its federal preemption claim, NCLH asserted that the CDC’s
CSO, technical instructions, and operation manual were all federal
regulations that the CDC created pursuant to its regulatory authority

Complaint at 16–17, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees,
2021 WL 2945834 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2021) (No. 1:21-cv-22492) [hereinafter
Complaint].
53
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1147–48. NCLH sued Dr. Rivkees because
“[a]s Surgeon General, [he] is the head of the Florida Department of Health, which
is responsible for enforcing the relevant provisions of Florida Statute
§ 381.00316.” See Complaint, supra note 52, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
54
Complaint, supra note 52, at 1, 19.
55
Id. at 2. This Comment’s discussion of the federal preemption and substantive due process claims do not include Dr. Rivkees’ defenses thereto. This is because the source of the court filings used for this Comment, Bloomberg Law, did
not make Dr. Rivkees’ answer to the complaint freely available. Any information
on Dr. Rivkees’ defenses discussed in this Comment is derived from the district
court order.
56
See infra Section II.B.
52
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under 42 U.S.C. § 264. 57 These regulations centered around the
CSO’s requirement that a cruise line pursuing satisfaction of step
two of the CSO framework under the Attestation Method verify that
at least ninety-five percent of crew and passengers are fully vaccinated for COVID-19. 58 NCLH claimed that “[o]btaining vaccine
documentation is the only adequate and reliable way of verifying”
that at least ninety-five percent of crew and passengers are vaccinated. 59 Because section 381.00316 prohibits such requirement of
proof of COVID-19 vaccination and thereby conflicts with the CDC
regulations, NCLH claimed that the CDC regulations preempted
section 381.00316 under 42 U.S.C. § 264(e). 60 The district court order did not address the merits of the federal preemption claim because NCLH was likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment free speech and dormant Commerce Clause claims, 61 which
the district court addressed extensively. 62
2. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH CLAIM
In its First Amendment claim, NCLH asserted that section
381.00316 presents a content-based, speaker-based, and listenerbased restriction on the transmission of health-related information
between businesses and their customers. 63 Because COVID-19 vaccination documentation is health-related, NCLH claimed that any
state restriction on such speech must pass “strict scrutiny or some
other form of heightened scrutiny.” 64 NCLH claimed that section
381.00316 neither advances a “sufficiently important governmental
Complaint, supra note 52, at 13–14. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 264(a)
(providing that the United States Surgeon General is authorized to make and enforce regulations designed to stop the spread of communicable diseases).
58
See Complaint, supra note 52, at 13–14.
59
Id. at 14.
60
Id. at 13–14. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (stating that regulations
made under 42 U.S.C. § 264 preempt state law “to the extent that such a provision
conflicts with an exercise of Federal authority under this section or section 266 of
this title.”).
61
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1143,
1178 (S.D. Fla. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2021).
62
See id. at 1156–78 (reviewing NCLH’s First Amendment and dormant
Commerce Clause claims).
63
Complaint, supra note 52, at 15. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
64
Complaint, supra note 52, at 15.
57
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interest” in prohibiting transmission of what NCLH called “potentially life-saving information about [passengers’] vaccination status,” nor is section 381.00316 “adequately tailored to any such interest.” 65 Therefore, NCLH claimed section 381.00316 infringes its
First Amendment right to free speech. 66
Dr. Rivkees made two primary arguments to defend against
NCLH’s First Amendment claim. The first was that section
381.00316 does not regulate speech at all but is merely an economic
regulation that does not implicate the First Amendment. 67 Dr. Rivkees claimed that section 381.00316 “only prohibits business-related conduct: the act of conditioning service on customers providing documentation certifying COVID-19 vaccination.” 68 In other
words, Dr. Rivkees argued that section 381.00316 does not implicate the First Amendment “because it only affects what businesses
cannot do . . . not what they may or may not say.” 69
The district court disagreed with Dr. Rivkees’ first argument.70
The district court first stated that “dissemination of information [is]
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” 71 Accordingly,

65

Id.
Id.
67
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1159.
68
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1158 (alteration in original) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 570 (2011)). Sorrell involved two consolidated lawsuits, one brought
by three Vermont data miners and one brought by an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers that made brand-name drugs. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 561. In these
lawsuits, the plaintiffs contended that a Vermont statute restricted speech in violation of the First Amendment. The statute “restrict[ed] the sale, disclosure, and
use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors.” Id. at 557. Additionally, “[s]ubject to certain exceptions, the information
may not be sold, disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or used for
marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that the statute presented a content-based and speaker-based restriction on speech
because the statute disfavored marketing (i.e., speech with a particular content) as
well as pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers who conduct marketing for
pharmaceutical manufacturers (i.e., particular speakers). See id. at 563–64. Moreover, the statute was not merely a commercial regulation because its restrictions
were “directed at certain content and [were] aimed at particular speakers.” See id.
at 566–67. Therefore, heightened judicial scrutiny applied, which requires that, to
66

1048

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

transmission of COVID-19 vaccination documentation between a
consumer and a business constitutes dissemination of information
and thereby speech. 72 The Court next stated that section 381.00316
is “a content-based restriction [of speech] because it singles out documentation regarding a particular subject matter (certification of
COVID-19 vaccination or post-infection recovery) and subjects it to
restrictions (business may not require them for entry or services) that
do not apply to documents regarding other topics” (e.g., documentation of negative COVID-19 test result). 73 Furthermore, the district
court was not persuaded that section 381.00316 is merely an economic regulation. 74 The district court stated that an economic regulation does not abridge First Amendment free speech if speech is
affected merely incidentally, but a statute has more than an incidental effect on speech if it “is specifically directed at certain content.” 75 Accordingly, the district court held that section 381.00316
does not merely incidentally affect speech because it directly “singles out and disfavors only . . . documentary proof of COVID-19
vaccination.” 76 In sum, the district court rejected Dr. Rivkees’ argument that section 381.00316 is merely an economic regulation that
does not implicate the First Amendment. 77
Dr. Rivkees’ second defense against NCLH’s First Amendment
claim was that if section 381.00316 does regulate speech, it regulates commercial speech, which is subject only to the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of

be constitutional, the statute “directly advance[] a substantial governmental interest and that the measure [be] drawn to achieve that interest.” See id. at 572. The
Court held that the regulation failed to withstand heighted scrutiny and thereby
violated the First Amendment because the burdens that the statute imposed on
speech impermissibly outweighed Vermont’s proffered interests of protection of
medical privacy and achievement of the policy objectives of improved public
health and reduced healthcare costs. See id. at 571–79.
72
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1159.
73
Id. at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74
Id. at 1159.
75
See id. at 1160–61 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
76
Id. at 1160.
77
See id. at 1158–62.
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New York, 78 “a less rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny.” 79 Central Hudson gave a four-part test for determining whether a restriction on commercial speech comports with the First Amendment:
[A] restriction on commercial speech is valid under
the First Amendment if: (1) the speech is not misleading and does not concern unlawful activity, (2)
the government has a substantial interest in restricting the speech, (3) the regulation directly advances
the asserted government interest, and (4) the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest. 80
The district court in Rivkees explained that Dr. Rivkees’ commercial speech defense was dead on arrival: the speech that section
381.00316 restricts is not commercial because it “does not relate

78
447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson involved a constitutional challenge
by an electric utility company, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. (“Central
Hudson”) to a regulation made by New York’s Public Service Commission
(“Commission”) that prohibited promotional advertising by an electrical utility on
the ground that the regulation restricted commercial speech in violation of the
First Amendment. See id. at 558, 560. The U.S. Supreme Court applied a fourpart test for determining whether the regulation’s restriction of commercial speech
was constitutional. See infra note 80. Under this test, the Court held that, although
the regulation directly advanced New York’s substantial interest in energy conservation, the Commission failed to show that the regulation was not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568–
71. Firstly, the ban on any promotional advertising by an electrical utility would
prevent the advertising of more energy-efficient products and services, which supports, not undermines, New York’s substantial interest in energy conservation.
See id. at 570. Secondly, “[t]o further its policy of conservation, the Commission
could [have] attempt[ed] to restrict the format and content of Central Hudson’s
advertising,” such as “requir[ing] that the advertisement include information
about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current
conditions and for the foreseeable future.” Id. at 570–71. Because the Commission
failed to show that the regulation was not more extensive than necessary to serve
New York’s interest in energy conservation, the Court held that the Commission’s
regulation restricted commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment. See
id. at 571.
79
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.
80
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 566.

1050

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

solely to an economic interest.” 81 Indeed, NCLH showed that it had
non-economic justifications for requiring COVID-19 vaccination
documentation, such as “prevent[ing] a COVID-19 outbreak aboard
its ships and [in] the communities where it travels.” 82 Additionally,
“unlike advertising and marketing,” COVID-19 vaccination documentation does not propose a commercial transaction. 83 The district
court went on to say that even if commercial speech were at issue
here, section 381.00316 fails the Central Hudson test because Dr.
Rivkees failed to show (1) that Florida “has a substantial interest in
restricting” the transmission of COVID-19 vaccination documentation, 84 (2) that section 381.00316 directly advances Florida’s proffered interests of “protecting the medical privacy of its citizens” and
“avoiding discrimination [against unvaccinated Florida residents]
through balkanization of the marketplace,” 85 and (3) that section
381.00316 is not more extensive than necessary to serve those interests. 86 In sum, the district court held that section 381.00316 does not
restrict commercial speech, and even if it did, it fails the Central
Hudson test. For the foregoing reasons, the district court ruled that
NCLH was likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment
claim. 87
3. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
CLAIM
In its Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim,
NCLH claimed that section 381.00316 “violates the fundamental
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir.
2015) (“Commercial speech is a narrow category of necessarily expressive communication that is related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience, or that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561 and Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976))).
82
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1163.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1164–65.
85
Id. at 1164–68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86
See id. at 1168. It is noteworthy that, according to the district court, Dr.
Rivkees failed to show the three enumerated items above because he presented
“no evidence” for these items. See id. at 1164–68.
87
Id. at 1169.
81
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due process rights of NCLH, its crew, and its passengers to make
well-informed medical decisions affecting oneself and to exercise
autonomy over one’s body.” 88 NCLH claimed that section
381.00316 also “prevent[ed] NCLH and its employees from supporting themselves via their chosen occupation, which likewise implicates a fundamental due process right.” 89 NCLH stated that strict
scrutiny applied to the due process claim because fundamental rights
were being affected. 90 NCLH again argued that section 381.00316
fails rational basis review, let alone strict scrutiny; therefore, it violates Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. 91 The district
court order did not mention NCLH’s due process claim. 92
4. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CLAIM
NCLH claimed that section 381.00316 violates the dormant
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution because section
381.00316’s prohibition on requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination from consumers would disrupt or even terminate NCLH’s interstate and foreign cruise operations coming out of Florida. 93 The
district court described the dormant Commerce Clause as follows:
While the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce,
“this affirmative grant of authority to Congress also
encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on
the authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.” The dormant Commerce
Clause “prevents a [s]tate from ‘jeopardizing the

Complaint, supra note 52, at 18 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (listing several substantive due process rights related to the
body, such as the right to bodily integrity and the right to abortion)).
89
Id. (citing Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883, 920 (W.D. Pa.
2020) (“[T]he right of citizens to support themselves by engaging in a chosen
occupation is deeply rooted in our nation’s legal and cultural history and has long
been recognized as a component of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”)).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See generally Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1147–80.
93
Complaint, supra note 52, at 16.
88
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welfare of the Nation as a whole’ by ‘plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that
commerce wholly within those borders would not
bear.” 94
In other words, the dormant Commerce Clause “limits the authority of states to enact laws that [directly or] indirectly affect––
that substantially burden––interstate commerce.” 95 NCLH planned
on requiring 100% vaccinated cruises not only to comply with the
CSO and its subsequent instructions, but also to effectuate the
smoothest and possibly the only practicable way of operating its interstate and foreign cruises. 96 Accordingly, NCLH claimed that section 381.00316’s ban on requiring COVID-19 vaccination documentation would impede NCLH’s ability to operate its cruises to
and from other states and countries as planned, which would result
in a massive impairment or even destruction of the interstate and
foreign commerce that NCLH creates out of Florida. 97
When determining the constitutionality of a law under the
dormant Commerce Clause, courts use a two-tiered analysis. 98 The
first tier of the analysis concerns “whether the law or regulation at
issue directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or has the effect of favoring in-state economic interests.” 99 If
the law does express such direct economic regulation, it is automatically held invalid unless the state shows that the law advances a
legitimate local purpose and a reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative is unavailable to serve such purpose. 100 In this case, the district court determined that the first tier of the analysis did not apply

94
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(citing Fla. Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 703 F.3d 1230, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2012) and Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429,
433 (2005)).
95
Id.
96
See id. at 1154, 1174–75.
97
See Complaint, supra note 52, at 17.
98
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (citing Fla. Transp. Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d
at 1243).
99
Id. (alteration omitted).
100
Id.
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because section 381.00316 “does not directly regulate, or affirmatively discriminate against, interstate commerce.” 101
Because the first tier of the analysis did not apply to section
381.00316, the district court proceeded to the second tier of the analysis, which it described as follows: “if a state’s facially nondiscriminatory law advances a legitimate local interest and has only indirect
effects on interstate commerce, courts apply the balancing test from
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 102 and invalidate the law only if the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits to the
state.” 103 Additionally, the Pike test requires courts to “consider
whether states could have implemented alternatives that impose
smaller, less substantial burdens on interstate commerce.” 104 The
district court stated that in his response to NCLH’s dormant Commerce Clause claim, Dr. Rivkees failed to assert any local interest
“that justifies [section 381.00316’s] alleged burdens on interstate
commerce,” a fact that the district court said in itself makes section

Id. at 1169–70 (emphasis added).
397 U.S. 137 (1970). Pike involved a lawsuit brought by Bruce Church,
Inc., a commercial farming company, against Loren J. Pike, the official charged
with enforcing the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act, claiming that
an order the Pike made pursuant to his enforcement authority under the Act unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. See id. at 138. To determine the
order’s constitutionality, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a test that (1) balanced
local state interests and the burdens on interstate commerce to determine whether
the burdens on interstate commerce clearly exceeded the local benefits, and (2)
inquired as to whether the local state interests “could be promoted . . . with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.” See id. at 142; infra notes 93–94. The Court held
that, although Arizona had a legitimate state interest in “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the reputation of growers within the State,” the burden it imposed on
Bruce Church––the requirement of building and operating an unnecessary and
expensive packing plant in Arizona––clearly exceeded Arizona’s local benefits
from the order. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 143–45. Therefore, the Court held the order
unconstitutional. See id. at 145.
103
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (internal citations omitted) (alterations
omitted) (emphasis added). The district court elaborated that under Pike, “incidental” effects can manifest the “indirect effects” mentioned in the Pike test. See
id.
104
Id. at 1171.
101
102
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381.00316 fail the Pike test. 105 However, the district court referenced Dr. Rivkees’ response to NCLH’s First Amendment claim to
presume that Florida’s putative local interests that justify burdening
interstate commerce were “protecting the medical privacy of its citizens” and “avoiding discrimination [against unvaccinated Florida
residents] through balkanization of the marketplace.” 106 The district
court said that not only did Dr. Rivkees fail to cite any “relevant
authority to support his claim that these objectives constitute legitimate state interests,” but he also propounded these interests without
explaining “why they are legitimate [state interests] or how they
weigh against any burdens that [section 381.00316] imposes on interstate commerce.” 107 The district court saw this as problematic because “[Dr. Rivkees’] mere assertion of protecting medical privacy
and preventing ‘discriminating’ against unvaccinated persons, without more, fail[ed] to satisfy the dictates of Pike and its progeny.” 108
105
Id. It is worth noting that Dr. Rivkees provided only a three-paragraph response to NCLH’s dormant Commerce Clause claim. Id. As this Comment discusses, Dr. Rivkees’ short, seemingly scant response seems to have contributed
greatly to the district court ruling in NCLH’s favor on this claim.
106
See id. at 1164, 1171.
107
Id. at 1171.
108
See id. The district court cited multiple cases, including Pike, to support
this proposition. Rivkees and Pike both involved nondiscriminatory laws, which
justified Rivkees’ use of the Pike test to determine whether section 381.00316 violates the dormant Commerce Clause. See supra note 101; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
(applying a test for laws that “regulate[] even-handedly”). The other cases that the
district court cited involved discriminatory laws. See Island Silver & Spice, Inc.
v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2008); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d
1104, 1114 (11th Cir. 2002). In line with the two-tiered analysis approach to
dormant Commerce Clause claims, different tests for constitutionality under the
dormant Commerce Clause exist for discriminatory and nondiscriminatory laws,
respectively. See supra note 98–103; Island Spice, 542 F.3d at 846. Pike did not
expressly mention whether the state has the burden of showing something “more”
than just asserting an allegedly legitimate state interest––such as showing why its
state interests are legitimate and how these interests weigh against the burdens on
interstate commerce––as the district court in Rivkees suggested. See Pike, 397
U.S. at 142–46; Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. The other cases that the district
court cited indicated that the state does have this burden, at least to the extent of
showing why its state interests are legitimate. See Island Spice, 542 F.3d at 847
(“In general, preserving a small town community is a legitimate purpose . . . , in
this instance, Islamorada has not demonstrated that it has any small town character
to preserve.”); Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1114 (“This does not mean, however, that
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For these reasons, the district court indicated that NCLH was likely
to succeed on the merits that section 381.00316 fails the Pike test.109
Conversely, NCLH made a strong showing for why section
381.00316 “imposes substantial burdens on interstate commerce
that will directly affect [NCLH’s] abilities to operate” its cruises. 110
Every country and port that NCLH intended to sail to had “varying,
often complicated requirements” regarding COVID-19. 111 Thus,
NCLH contended that without requiring COVID-19 vaccination
documentation from its passengers, it would be forced to “re-route
around Florida or else go through tortured, costly, time-consuming,
damaging contortions in order to go to or from Florida relative to
other ports, none of which have any such [b]an [on proof of COVID19 vaccination documentation] and many of which require proof of
vaccinations.” 112 Dr. Rivkees contended that NCLH could in fact
comply with the COVID-19 requirements of the different ports by
engaging in testing and quarantining of passengers. 113 The district
the State can prevail without evidence . . . we find it inadequate the State’s proffered concerns of protecting minors and ensuring orderly markets.” (emphasis in
original)). Even though Pike and the other cases could be seen as distinguishable
because Pike involved a nondiscriminatory law and the other cases involved discriminatory laws, it is more likely than not that regardless of whether the law is
discriminatory the state has the burden of showing something “more” than just
asserting an allegedly legitimate state interest. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (“When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to
justify both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests
at stake.”) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, which gives the test for determining the
constitutionality of nondiscriminatory laws under the dormant Commerce
Clause); Island Spice, 542 F.3d at 847 (citing Hunt’s test to support its assertion
that “[t]he burden is on Islamorada to justify the ordinance’s discriminatory effects.”); Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1109 (citing Hunt’s test). Even if the state does
not have this burden under Pike, the state could benefit from briefing on the matter, especially when the plaintiff gives considerable evidence in support of substantial burdens on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at
1172 (“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits in showing that Section
381.00316 imposes substantial burdens on interstate commerce . . . .”).
109
See id. at 1172.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 1173.
112
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113
Id.
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court rejected this argument, holding that without COVID-19 vaccination documentation—the “one constant that facilitates cruise
line customers’ access” to the different ports––the “myriad, rapidlychanging [COVID-19] requirements” of the different ports “make it
not only impractical, but also financially, legally, and logistically
onerous for cruise lines like NCLH to comply.” 114 Therefore, the
district court held that the burden on NCLH’s interstate and foreign
cruise operations that section 381.00316 would cause reflects a burden on interstate commerce that clearly exceeds any local interest
that Florida has. 115 Consequently, the district court held that NCLH
was likely to succeed on the merits that section 381.00316 fails the
second tier of the Pike test. 116
Moreover, the district court stated that Dr. Rivkees did not address Pike’s less-restrictive alternatives component and that NCLH
can likely “show at the merits stage that there are alternatives that
impose lesser burdens on interstate commerce.” 117 The district court
Id. at 1174.
See id. at 1175.
116
See id. at 1177.
117
Id. at 1176. It is unlikely that under Pike, Dr. Rivkees had the burden of
showing that less restrictive alternatives were unavailable. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 (1981) (“[W]e find that no approach
with ‘a lesser impact on interstate activities’ . . . is available.” (quoting Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). Instead, it seems that normally
either a plaintiff or the court considers whether less restrictive alternatives were
available. See id. at 473–74 (mentioning that plaintiff-respondents “suggested
several alternative statutory schemes, but these alternatives [were] either more
burdensome on commerce than the [law in question] . . . or less likely to be effective” and not mentioning any burden imposed on the state to show that less restrictive alternatives were unavailable); Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty.,
939 F.2d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1991) (listing possible less restrictive alternatives
that the court––not the parties––seemed to have conceived) (citing Pike, 397 U.S.
at 142). But see supra note 108; Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (“When discrimination against commerce of the type we
have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it . . . in terms
of . . . the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve
the local interests at stake.”). Even if Dr. Rivkees did not have this burden under
Pike, clearly he could have benefitted from briefing on the matter, especially when
one could argue that, given that Rivkees was a case involving a dormant Commerce Clause claim, it was foreseeable that the court would conceive possible less
restrictive alternatives to section 381.00316’s ban on proof of COVID-19 vaccination. See infra note 118.
114
115
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listed some possible less restrictive alternatives that could have
worked toward advancing Florida’s asserted local interests, such as
providing a carveout in the statute for cruise lines or interstate activities and services in general. 118 The district court stated that Dr. Rivkees’ failure to show the unavailability of less restrictive alternatives
“undermine[d] the survival of Section 381.00316 when applying the
Pike balancing test.” 119 For the foregoing reasons, the district court
ruled that NCLH was likely to succeed on the merits of its dormant
Commerce Clause claim. 120
C.
Cruise Contracts and Admiralty Jurisdiction
Cruise contracts are maritime contracts, which trigger admiralty
jurisdiction. 121 Article III of the U.S. Constitution grants admiralty
jurisdiction to federal courts. 122 The Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts was meant to maintain uniformity
of the maritime law as to protect maritime commerce, which is characteristically interstate and international. 123 Congress understood
that granting the individual states admiralty jurisdiction would undermine “the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
Id. at 1177.
120
See id.
121
See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23–24 (2004) (“This suit was
properly brought in diversity, but it could also be sustained under the admiralty
jurisdiction by virtue of the maritime contracts involved.”) (citing G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY 31 (2d ed. 1975) (“Ideally, the [admiralty jurisdiction over contracts] out [sic] to include those and only those things principally
connected with maritime transportation.”)); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991) (“First, this is a case in admiralty, and federal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize.”); Milanovich
v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The Milanoviches’ cruise ticket is a maritime contract and thus the substantive law to be
applied in this case is the general federal maritime law . . . .”); Meadors v. Carnival Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (“A cruise line contract is
a maritime contract governed by general maritime law.”); 1 JOHN A. EDGINTON
ET AL., BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 181, LEXIS+ (coverage through May 2022)
[hereinafter BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY] (“[T]he jurisdiction of admiralty in contract depends upon the subject matter of the contract. If the nature and character
of the contract is maritime, that is to say, if the contract is related to a maritime
service or a maritime transaction, there is admiralty jurisdiction.”).
122
Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 23 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).
123
See id. at 25, 28.
118
119
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aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States and with each other or with foreign states.”124
Furthermore, maritime contracts are generally governed by federal
maritime law. 125 This means that, generally, federal maritime law–
–not state law––governs not only judicial review of a maritime contract, but also the maritime contract’s creation (i.e., which provisions may or may not be included) and enforceability. 126 However,
federal maritime law’s governance of maritime contracts is not absolute, 127 and courts have weighed in on the exceptions for when
state law governs a maritime contract instead. 128
1. WILBURN BOAT CO. V. FIREMAN’S FUND INSURANCE CO.
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. was a
unique Supreme Court case that underscored that federal law does
Id. at 28.
See Milanovich, 954 F.2d at 766; Meadors, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 1307; see
also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 734–35 (1961) (applying a test
that presumes that federal maritime law governs a maritime contract unless the
contract is “of such a ‘local’ nature” that state law should apply instead).
126
The research for this Comment supports this proposition even though no
source was found that states this proposition expressly. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (holding that state legislation is invalid if it contravenes
the general maritime law); Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 312, 314
(1919) (deciding whether a maritime contract can “be nullified by the local laws
of a state . . . so as to prevent its enforcement in an admiralty court of the United
States” and holding that the state law could not void the maritime contract because
“[i]f one state may declare such contracts void for one reason, another may do
likewise for another. Thus . . . the uniformity of rules governing such contracts
may be destroyed by perhaps conflicting rules of the states.”); see also, e.g., 1
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 121, at §§ 112–114, 121, 181 (mentioning
nothing that indicates that state law may control the creation of a maritime contract or prohibit its enforcement); 4 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 121, at
§ 1.04 (mentioning nothing that indicates that state law may control the creation
of a maritime contract or prohibit its enforcement); Norman J. Ronneberg Jr., Life
Preserver: An Overview of U.S. Maritime Law for Non-Maritime Lawyers, 26
U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 1, 3–4, 26–27 (2013) (highlighting that the “saving to suitors”
clause of The Judiciary Act of 1789 is related to remedies and litigation, and requires that substantive maritime law be applied in dispute resolution).
127
See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955)
(“But it does not follow . . . that every term in every maritime contract can only
be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule.”).
128
See infra Sections I.C.1–4.
124
125
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not have absolute domain over maritime contracts. 129 Wilburn Boat
involved the burning-down of a houseboat moored on an artificial
inland lake located between Texas and Oklahoma. 130 The houseboat
was insured under a marine insurance policy that covered fire damage. 131 The owner of the houseboat breached two warranties in the
marine insurance policy (a kind of maritime contract) 132: one that
said the houseboat may not be sold or otherwise transferred, and one
that said the houseboat must be used only for “private pleasure purposes.” 133 The Court had to determine which law governed fulfillment of the marine insurance policy’s warranties: Texas law, which
did not allow an insured’s breach as a defense unless the breach contributed to the loss, or federal maritime law, which the lower courts
said allegedly included a rule that any breach of the policy barred
recovery. 134 Even though the Court acknowledged that federal maritime law generally governs maritime contracts, the Court stated that
not “every term in every maritime contract” needs to be controlled
by a federal maritime rule and that the states can at times have regulatory power in maritime matters. 135
To answer the question of whether federal maritime law or state
law applied to this marine insurance policy, the Court laid out a twopart test: “(1) Is there a judicially established federal admiralty rule
governing these warranties? (2) If not, should we fashion one?”136
As for the first part of the test, the Court said no: no case law or
statute existed that “established [an] admiralty rule requiring strict
fulfillment of marine insurance warranties . . . .” 137 As for the second part of the test, the Court determined that such a rule was best
left to the states’ domain. 138 The Court supported its conclusion by
explaining that (1) insurance is an area that “has been a primarily
state function” since the country’s inception, (2) Congress passed
See Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 313.
Id. at 311.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 312–13.
133
Id. at 311; see also Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters
LLC, 996 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2021).
134
Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 311–12.
135
See id. at 313–14.
136
Id. at 314.
137
See id. at 314, 316.
138
Id. at 321.
129
130
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the McCarran Act to “assure that existing state power to regulate
insurance would continue,” and (3) the Court’s fashioning of such
an admiralty rule “involves varied policy considerations and is obviously one which Congress is peculiarly suited to make.” 139 For
these reasons, the Court declined to fashion an admiralty rule in this
case, indicating that Texas law and not federal maritime law should
apply to the marine insurance policy’s warranties. 140 It is important
to note that Wilburn Boat’s two-part test has seemingly been confined solely to cases involving marine insurance policies. 141 As discussed later in this Part, the Supreme Court has created more generally applicable tests and principles for determining whether federal
maritime law or state law governs a maritime contract. 142
2. KOSSICK V. UNITED FRUIT CO.
Kossick v. United Fruit Co. established the general test for determining whether federal maritime law or state law governs a maritime contract. Kossick involved an oral contract between a seaman
and his employer, United Fruit Company, for hospital services the
seaman would receive to treat his thyroid ailment. 143 The oral contract provided that if the seaman “enter[ed] a Public Health Service
Hospital . . . [United Fruit] would assume responsibility for all consequences of improper or inadequate treatment.” 144 The seaman
would receive these public hospital services instead of medical care
by a private physician; the seaman seemingly viewed medical care
by a private physician as “the full extent of his maritime right to
See id. at 316, 318–20.
See id. at 321.
141
See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961) (stating that
Wilburn Boat was not “apposite” to Kossick’s determination of whether federal
maritime law or state law applied to an oral maritime contract and that “[t]he application of state law in [Wilburn Boat] was justified by the Court on the basis of
a lack of any provision of maritime law governing the matter there presented”);
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d 1161,
1166 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Irwin v. Eagle Star Ins., 455 F.2d 827, 829–30 (5th
Cir. 1972) (claiming that “Kossick tend[ed] to limit the Wilburn Boat opinion to
its facts”)); see also Ronneberg, supra note 126, at 8 (showing the Wilburn Boat
test as a marine insurance-related test that is distinct from the tests and principles
that apply to maritime contracts generally).
142
See infra Sections I.C.2–3.
143
Kossick, 365 U.S. at 732.
144
Id.
139
140
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maintenance and cure.” 145 The seaman underwent treatment at a
hospital pursuant to the oral contract, “suffered grievous unwonted
bodily injury” in the course of the treatment, and brought a diversity
complaint in the Southern District of New York to enforce the oral
contract as to make the employer pay $250,000 in damages. 146 The
district court dismissed the complaint and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the New York Statute of Frauds invalidated the
contract because it was not in writing. 147
The question presented to the Supreme Court on certiorari was
which law should apply to the oral contract: the New York Statute
of Frauds, which would invalidate the oral contract, or federal maritime law, which would permit enforcement of the contract even
though it was not in writing. 148 The Court established a two-part test
to determine whether federal maritime law or state law applied to
the contract: (1) Was the contract a maritime contract? (2) If so, was
the contract “of such a ‘local’ nature” that state law should apply
instead of federal maritime law? 149 “Local” as used in the second
part of the test meant that “application of state law would not disturb
the uniformity of maritime law . . . .” 150
As for the first part of the test, the Court determined that the oral
contract was a maritime contract. 151 The Court acknowledged that
whether a contract is a maritime one is a “conceptual rather than
spatial” determination that centers on “whether the transaction [that
the contract concerns] relates to ships and vessels, masters and mariners, as the agents of commerce.” 152 Using this conceptual approach, the Court acknowledged that the seaman’s consideration under the oral contract was his “good faith forbearance to press what
he considered––perhaps erroneously––to be the full extent of his
maritime right to maintenance and cure.” 153 In view of this acknowledgment, the Court determined that the contract “was sufficiently
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

See id. at 738.
Id. at 732.
See id. at 733.
See id. at 733–35.
Id. at 735.
See id. at 738.
Id.
Id. at 735–36 (ellipses omitted) (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 738.
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related to peculiarly maritime concerns” and was thereby a maritime
contract. 154
Moving to the second part of the test, the Court determined that
the oral contract was not of such a local nature that state law should
apply over federal maritime law. 155 Firstly, the Court recognized
that contracts stipulate obligations that parties voluntarily undertake,
as opposed to “case[s] of tort liability or public regulations,” which
impose obligations on people “simply by virtue of the authority of
the State or Federal Government.” 156 The voluntary undertaking of
contract obligations creates the presumption of applying the law that
will validate the contract. 157 Secondly, the Court said that the oral
contract at hand was founded on an inherently non-local concept of
providing maintenance and cure for seamen of any nationality at any
port. 158 Thus, the Court reasoned that the contract “may well have
been made anywhere in the world, and that the validity of it should
be judged by one law wherever it was made.” 159 The Court went on
to say that New York’s interest in not assisting the accomplishment
of contract fraud was insufficient to render the oral contract “peculiarly a matter of state and local concern” given the aforementioned
“countervailing considerations.” 160 Therefore, because the Court determined that the oral contract was a maritime one and not of such a
local nature that state law should govern, federal maritime law governed the contract, which permitted its enforcement even though it
was not in writing. 161
The Court also mentioned that Wilburn Boat and its two-part test
were inapposite in this case because “[t]he application of state law
in [Wilburn Boat] was justified by the Court on the basis of a lack
of any provision of maritime law governing [fulfillment of marine
insurance warranties].” 162 Later case law asserted that this language
Id. at 738.
Id. at 741.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
Id.
160
Id. (internal citation omitted).
161
See id. at 742.
162
Id.; see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314–
16 (1955) (discussing whether a federal maritime rule exists regarding fulfillment
of marine insurance warranties).
154
155
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from Kossick “tend[ed] to limit the Wilburn Boat opinion to its
facts,” which had the effect of upholding Kossick’s two-part test as
the default, general test for determining whether federal maritime
law or state law should apply to a maritime contract. 163
3. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. V. KIRBY
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby applied Kossick’s twopart test and affirmed that Kossick’s test is the default general test
for determining whether federal maritime law or state law applies to
a maritime contract. 164 Norfolk Southern involved a plan to transport
ten containers of machinery from Kirby, an Australian manufacturing company, to the General Motors plant located outside Huntsville, Alabama. 165 The logistical plan to get the machinery from
Kirby to the General Motors plant was as follows: (1) Kirby contracted with International Cargo Control (“ICC”), an Australian
freight forwarding company, to arrange for end-to-end transportation; (2) ICC contracted with Hamburg Süd, a German ocean shipping company, to transport the machinery from Australia to Savannah, Georgia; and (3) Hamburg Süd hired Norfolk Southern Railway
Company to transport the machinery from Savannah to the Huntsville plant. 166 The transportation of machinery involved two bills of
lading, which the Supreme Court deemed contracts: one between
Kirby and ICC, and one between ICC and Hamburg Süd. 167 Both
bills of lading included liability limitations for machinery damaged
in transit, and through so-called “Himalaya Clauses” the bills extended these liability limitations to “other downstream parties expected to take part in the contract’s execution.” 168 After a Norfolk
Southern train derailed in transit between Savannah and Huntsville
causing damage to the machinery, Kirby sued Norfolk Southern in
the Northern District of Georgia, asserting diversity jurisdiction and

See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d
1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Irwin v. Eagle Star Ins., 455 F.2d 827, 829–
30 (5th Cir. 1972)).
164
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22, 23 (2004).
165
Id. at 19.
166
Id. at 19–21.
167
Id. at 18–19, 21.
168
Id. at 20–21.
163
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making claims in tort and contract. 169 The district court held that
Kirby’s recovery was limited to $500 per container per the bills’
Himalaya Clauses. 170 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, stating that
Norfolk Southern did not have privity with the bills of lading and
ICC was not acting as Kirby’s agent when it made its bill of lading
with Hamburg Süd; therefore, Norfolk Southern was not subject to
either bill’s liability limitations. 171
The Supreme Court on certiorari determined that whether the
Himalaya Clauses’ liability limitations applied to Norfolk Southern
could be decided by applying Kossick’s two-part test. 172 As for the
first part of the test, the Court determined that the bills of lading
were maritime contracts. 173 Using the conceptual rather than spatial
approach to determining whether a contract is a maritime one, the
Court recognized that although the bills contemplated a land leg of
the machinery’s transportation, the bills were maritime contracts
“because their primary objective [was] to accomplish the transportation of goods by sea from Australia to the eastern coast of the
United States.” 174
The Court elaborated on the reasoning behind the second part of
Kossick’s two-part test. The Court restated this second part: “[a]
maritime contract’s interpretation may so implicate local interests as
to beckon interpretation by state law.” 175 The Court here added that
“when state interests cannot be accommodated without defeating a
federal interest . . . then federal substantive law should govern.”176
The Court suggested that the uniformity of maritime law is a federal
interest that state interests generally cannot overcome because the
uniformity of the maritime law protects the “fundamental interest
giving rise to maritime jurisdiction[:] . . . the protection of maritime
commerce.” 177 The bills of lading in this case were for international
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
171
See id. at 22.
172
Id. at 22–23.
173
Id. at 24.
174
Id. (emphasis added).
175
Id. at 27 (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961)).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 25, 28 (emphasis added) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines,
Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 611 (1991) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990)
(in turn quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982)))).
169
170
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transportation of goods––a form of maritime commerce––and their
liability limitation clauses could be applied anywhere in the
world. 178 The Court asserted that “[c]onfusion and inefficiency
[would] inevitably result if more than one body of law govern[ed]”
the meaning of the liability limitation clauses. 179 Understanding the
importance of maintaining uniformity of the maritime law and the
principle that one law should govern a contract when it could have
been made anywhere in the world, the Court determined that federal
maritime law and not state law should apply to the bills of lading.180
With these principles in mind, the Court turned to the merits of the
case, applying relevant federal case law and ultimately holding that
Norfolk Southern was entitled to the liability limitations as written
in the bills of lading. 181
4. TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CO. OF AMERICA V. OCEAN
REEF CHARTERS LLC
The recent case Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v.
Ocean Reef Charters LLC showed the Eleventh Circuit’s begrudging application of Wilburn Boat’s two-part test, and suggested it is
applicable only in the marine insurance context. 182 Travelers Property involved the sinking of a yacht during Hurricane Irma that was
insured under a one-year marine insurance policy from Travelers
Property Casualty Company. 183 The policy included two express
warranties: (1) that Ocean Reef Charters, the yacht’s owner, would
employ a professional captain for the yacht, and (2) that Ocean Reef
would have a professional crew member onboard the yacht. 184 When
Ocean Reef made a claim under the marine insurance policy after
the yacht’s sinking, Travelers denied coverage because Ocean Reef
breached the two express warranties. 185 Travelers requested sum-

Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
180
See id.
181
See id. at 30–36.
182
See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d
1161, 1168 (11th Cir. 2021).
183
Id. at 1163.
184
Id.
185
Id.
178
179
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mary judgment in the Southern District of Florida seeking declaration that Travelers owed no coverage to Ocean Reef because of
Ocean Reef’s breaches. 186 The parties argued about which law
should apply in determining whether Ocean Reef’s breaches precluded coverage under the policy: federal maritime law, which Travelers argued “requires strict compliance with express warranties in
marine insurance contracts,” or Florida’s “anti-technical statute,”
which permits coverage if a breach is unrelated to the claimed
loss. 187 The district court granted Travelers’ request for summary
judgment, concluding that the Eleventh Circuit previously fashioned
an admiralty rule that requires strict compliance with express warranties in marine insurance policies. 188
The Eleventh Circuit applied Wilburn Boat to determine which
law applied because, like Wilburn Boat, this case involved breaches
of express warranties in a marine insurance policy. 189 Because the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Wilburn Boat already decided
that state courts should have domain over regulating the insurance
industry in the absence of a relevant federal admiralty rule, the Eleventh Circuit needed to apply only the first part of Wilburn Boat’s
test in deciding the case: whether a federal admiralty rule governed
the express warranties in question. 190 The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in Wilburn Boat determined that
“there was no established federal maritime rule requiring strict fulfillment of marine insurance warranties,” 191 which negated the district court’s ruling that the Eleventh Circuit previously fashioned an

Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 396 F. Supp.
3d 1170, 1173 (S.D. Fla. 2019) rev’d, 996 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2021).
187
Travelers Prop., 996 F.3d at 1164.
188
Id.; see Travelers Prop., 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1175–76, 1178 (citing Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke’s Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988) and Hilton
Oil Transp. v. Jonas, 75 F.3d 627, 630 (11th Cir. 1996)).
189
See Travelers Prop., 996 F.3d at 1164.
190
See id. at 1165, 1169 (“Noting that the choice as to what rule to adopt involved policy considerations best left to Congress, the Court concluded that it was
going to leave the regulation of marine insurance where it has been––with the
states.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted)).
191
Id. at 1164.
186
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admiralty rule that strict compliance was required for express warranties in marine insurance policies. 192 Because Wilburn Boat was
Supreme Court precedent by which the Eleventh Circuit was bound,
the Eleventh Circuit held that Florida’s anti-technical statute governed the effect of Ocean Reef’s breaches of the marine insurance
policy’s express warranties. 193
Despite applying Wilburn Boat in this case, the Eleventh Circuit
expressed its discontent with Wilburn Boat 194 and highlighted two
major problems. 195 The first is that it wrongly held that no entrenched federal admiralty rule exists regarding fulfillment of express warranties in marine insurance policies; on the contrary, “all
the major admiralty [appellate courts in the United States] had long
accepted the literal performance rule.” 196 The second was that Wilburn Boat undermines the uniformity of the maritime law, which
Kossick and Norfolk Southern deemed unacceptable. 197 Because of
the problems it perceived with Wilburn Boat, the Eleventh Circuit
in this case said that “if [it] were writing on a blank slate, [it] would
consider holding that there should be a uniform maritime rule regarding the effect of a breach of an express warranty in a marine
insurance policy—and from there determine what that uniform rule
should be.” 198 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit stated that neither
Kossick, Norfolk Southern, nor the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier decisions regarding fulfillment of express warranties in marine insurance policies overruled Wilburn Boat. 199 As a result, Wilburn Boat
is still good law, and the Eleventh Circuit is bound to apply it when
appropriate. 200
See id. at 1168 (explaining that Wilburn Boat’s holding that no federal admiralty rule existed regarding fulfillment of express warranties in marine insurance contracts overruled the Eleventh Circuit’s holdings in Cooke’s and Hilton
Oil that strict compliance with such express warranties is required under federal
admiralty law).
193
Id. at 1167, 1170.
194
Id. at 1167.
195
See id. at 1165.
196
Id. (quoting 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW
§ 19:15 (6th ed. 2018)).
197
See id.; Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738 (1961); Norfolk S.
Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 28 (2004).
198
See Travelers Prop., 996 F.3d at 1167.
199
See id. at 1166, 1168.
200
Id. at 1167.
192
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ANALYSIS

A. NCLH Could Have Won on an Admiralty Jurisdiction
Claim
Notably absent from NCLH’s list of claims in its complaint was
an admiralty jurisdiction claim. 201 As used in this Comment, an “admiralty jurisdiction claim” comprises two pieces: (1) a claim of admiralty jurisdiction is made because a maritime contract is involved,
and (2) following the establishment of admiralty jurisdiction, an assertion is made that under the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test 202 (or
even the Wilburn Boat test), 203 federal maritime law rather than state
law governs the relevant provisions of the maritime contract. Based
on the legal principles and case law discussed earlier in this Comment, 204 NCLH would have likely succeeded on an admiralty jurisdiction claim such that the district court would have enjoined section
381.00316 from prohibiting NCLH’s contractual requirement that
passengers show proof of COVID-19 vaccination before boarding
its cruise ships. 205
1. KOSSICK/NORFOLK SOUTHERN-BASED ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION CLAIM
NCLH’s passenger contracts require that passengers provide
proof of COVID-19 vaccination before boarding its cruise ships. 206
Because section 381.00316’s ban on requiring proof of COVID-19

See Complaint, supra note 52, at 2.
The rest of this Comment will describe the two-part test as established in
Kossick and elaborated on in Norfolk Southern as the Kossick/Norfolk Southern
test.
203
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
204
See discussion supra Section I.C.
205
See id.; NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, GUEST TICKET CONTRACT §§ 4(d), 5
(2021), https://www.ncl.com/sites/default/files/NCL-Guest-Ticket-Contract-0428-2021.pdf.
206
See NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE, supra note 205, at §§ 4(d), 5 (stating guests
must comply with “Carrier’s COVID-19 Policies and Procedures” set forth in
Section 4 and online at https://www.ncl.com/safe); Sail Safe, NORWEGIAN CRUISE
LINE, https://www.ncl.com/sail-safe (last visited on Dec. 29, 2021) (requiring
guests to “present proof of vaccination at the pier at embarkation in order to
board.”).
201
202
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vaccination conflicts with NCLH’s maritime passenger contracts, 207
NCLH should have claimed that the Kossick/Norfolk Southern twopart test should apply to determine whether section 381.00316 or
federal maritime law governs its passenger contracts. NCLH should
have asserted the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test instead of the Wilburn Boat test because the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test applies to
maritime contracts generally, whereas the Wilburn Boat test seems
to apply only to marine insurance policies. 208 Under the first part of
the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test, NCLH should have claimed that
the district court had admiralty jurisdiction because its passenger
contracts are maritime contracts. 209 Moving to the second part of the
test, NCLH should have argued that even if NCLH’s COVID-19
vaccination requirement in its passenger contracts “so implicated”
Florida’s putative local interests that section 381.00316 is meant to
advance, section 381.00316 cannot govern this requirement because
Florida’s interests “cannot be accommodated without defeating” the
federal interests of uniformity of the maritime law and the protection
of maritime commerce. 210 NCLH should have concluded that because section 381.00316 may not govern NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement in its passenger contracts and no federal law
appears to exist that prohibits cruise lines from making such a requirement, 211 NCLH may require its passengers to provide proof of
COVID-19 vaccination before boarding its cruise ships.
The district court would have likely agreed with NCLH that section 381.00316 may not govern NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement. The district court would have likely agreed that the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test applies to NCLH’s passenger contracts
and not Wilburn Boat’s test. This is not only because Wilburn Boat
seems to be confined to the marine insurance context, 212 but also
because the Eleventh Circuit––whose decisions bind and otherwise
influence the Southern District of Florida––has expressed discontent
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
209
See sources cited supra note 121.
210
See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 27 (2004); sources cited infra
notes 215–222, 224–225.
211
See generally, e.g., 10 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 121, at
§§ 11.01–11.08 (discussing topics related to COVID-19 and the cruise industry).
212
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
207
208
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with Wilburn Boat and is thereby likely reluctant to apply it.213
Therefore, applying the first part of the Kossick/Norfolk Southern
test, the district court would have agreed that NCLH’s passenger
contracts are maritime contracts because much precedent supports
this holding, and the district court would thereby declare admiralty
jurisdiction. 214
As for the second part of the test, in accordance with its ruling
on NCLH’s dormant Commerce Clause claim, 215 the district court
would have likely agreed with NCLH that federal maritime law, and
not section 381.00316, should govern NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement. Florida’s putative local interests
that section 381.00316 is meant to advance are Florida residents’
right to medical privacy and the prevention of discrimination against
unvaccinated Florida residents in the marketplace. 216 Under the Pike
test, the district court held the burden on interstate commerce that
section 381.00316’s ban on requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination created clearly exceeded the benefits to Florida stemming from
section 381.00316’s purported advancement of Florida’s putative
local interests; therefore, NCLH was likely to succeed on the merits
that section 381.00316 violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 217
This burden on interstate commerce that the district court recognized in its dormant Commerce Clause analysis under Pike––NCLH
having to subject its passengers to “an array of diverse quarantining
and testing requirements” of various interstate and foreign ports,
which would seriously impede NCLH’s ability to conduct its interstate and foreign cruise operations 218––implies the defeat of the federal interests of the uniformity in maritime law and the protection of
maritime commerce. Firstly, section 381.00316 disrupts uniformity
in maritime law by enacting a unique prohibition on proof of
COVID-19 vaccination 219––the “one constant that facilitates cruise
line [passengers’] access to” the various ports that NCLH’s cruise
See supra notes 141, 194–198 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra note 121.
215
See discussion on the similarities and differences between a dormant Commerce Clause claim and an admiralty jurisdiction claim infra Section II.B.
216
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1143,
1171 (S.D. Fla. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 2021).
217
See id. at 1175, 1177.
218
See id. at 1176.
219
See id. at 1173.
213
214
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ships visit.220 Secondly, this disruption of the uniformity of maritime law would seriously impede NCLH’s ability to conduct its interstate and foreign cruise operations, which entails impairing interstate commerce 221 (of which maritime commerce is a type). 222
Because the district court showed in its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis how the burden on interstate commerce that section
381.00316 creates implies the defeat of the federal interests of uniformity in the maritime law and the protection of maritime commerce, 223 the district court would have likely held that under the
Kossick/Norfolk Southern test, Florida’s putative local interests
could not be accommodated by section 381.00316’s ban on requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination. 224 Therefore, the district court
would have likely ruled that NCLH was likely to succeed on the
merits of its argument that section 381.00316 may not govern
NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement and
that NCLH may require its passengers to show proof of COVID-19
vaccination to gain access to its ships.225
2. WILBURN BOAT-BASED ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION CLAIM
Even assuming arguendo that the district court applied Wilburn
Boat’s two-part test to determine which law governs NCLH’s
COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement, the district
court would have likely still enjoined section 381.00316 from governing. At the onset of its review of this claim, the district court
would have established that it had admiralty jurisdiction because the
claim involved a maritime contract. 226 As for the first part of the

Id. at 1174.
See id. at 1174–75.
222
See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1994) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (referring to maritime commerce as “interstate and foreign”).
223
See supra notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
224
See id. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 25, 27–28 (2004).
225
See id. at 27.
226
See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955)
(“Since the insurance policy here sued on is a maritime contract the Admiralty
Clause of the Constitution brings it within federal jurisdiction.”).
220
221
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Wilburn Boat test, no federal maritime rule appears to exist regarding requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination and maritime contracts. 227
Proceeding to the second part of the test, the district court would
have likely fashioned a federal maritime rule that addresses cruise
lines requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Unlike the insurance industry discussed Wilburn Boat, health care (to which vaccinations are related) is not primarily a state function and states have
not primarily dominated its regulation; 228 indeed, health care has
been extensively federally regulated. 229 Additionally, Congress has
given no indication that it has acquiesced to the states in the regulation of COVID-19 vaccination or, more broadly, COVID-19-related
health care. 230
See generally, e.g., 1 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 121, at
§§ 181–188 (admiralty treatise sections related to maritime contracts); 10
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 121, at §§ 11.01–11.08 (discussing topics
related to COVID-19 and the cruise industry).
228
See Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 316–19, 321.
229
Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721 (E.D. Mich.
2005) (“The health-care industry is highly regulated at the state and federal levels.”); see also 8 Important Regulations in United States Health Care, REGIS
COLL., https://online.regiscollege.edu/blog/8-important-regulations-united-states
-health-care/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2021) (discussing several federal health care
laws, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act).
230
Congress and federal agencies that owe their existence to Congressional
legislation have enacted laws that regulate COVID-19-related health care. See,
e.g., Kate Goodrich, How the CARES Act Supports America’s Healthcare System
in the Fight Against COVID-19, JACKSON WALKER (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.jw.com/news/insights-cares-act-healthcare-provisions-covid19/ (describing how the CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 (Mar. 27, 2020), regulates
numerous COVID-19 related topics, such as “[r]equir[ing] group health plans and
health insurers to cover and reimburse providers of diagnostic testing relating to
COVID-19 at pre-emergency-period negotiated rates” and “[r]equir[ing] health
plans and issuers to rapidly cover ‘qualifying coronavirus preventative services’”); Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Blocks Biden’s Shot-or-Test Rule for Workers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2022, 2:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-13/supreme-court-halts-osha-rule-that-covered-80-million-workers (explaining how the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 86 Fed. Reg. 61402
(2021), the emergency temporary standard created by OSHA (a federal agency
created by Congress), which “required employers with 100 or more workers to
make them get vaccinated or be tested regularly”); State v. Becerra, 544 F. Supp.
3d 1241, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2021), appeal dismissed sub nom. State v. Dep’t of
Health and Hum. Servs., No. 21-12243 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2022). (enjoining the
227
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It is also unlikely that the district court would have deemed a
rule answering the question “May a cruise line include provisions in
its passenger contracts requiring passengers to show proof of
COVID-19 vaccination before boarding its ships?” 231 one that Congress is “peculiarly suited to make.” 232 Firstly, although Congress
effectively authorized the creation of the CDC, which created regulations such as the CSO and its subsequent instructions that regulated cruise passenger COVID-19 vaccination, the Middle District
of Florida in Becerra struck down these regulations, largely because
the Middle District of Florida determined that the CDC exceeded its
authority in creating these regulations. 233 This ruling indicated that
neither Congress nor the federal agencies that Congress has effectively created are the exclusive field-occupiers when it comes to
such regulation. 234 Therefore, the district court would have likely
acknowledged its “right to make decisional maritime law” in this
case on the rule question. 235 Secondly, it is unlikely that the district

CSO and its subsequent instructions, which were created by the CDC, a federal
agency effectively authorized by Congress, from governing cruise lines operating
in Florida). See generally Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat:
A Critical Guide (Part I), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 395, 429–33 (1997) (analyzing
how the U.S. Supreme Court’s argument in Wilburn Boat “that Congress had acquiesced in the regulation of marine insurance by the states” influenced its decision to not fashion an admiralty rule in that case).
231
This Comment will hereinafter refer to this question as the “rule question.”
232
See Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 320.
233
See Becerra, 544 F. Supp. 3d at 1304.
234
See id. But cf. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, 285–87 (1952) (explaining that although there was “absence of legislation” on the particular issue at hand regarding contribution, “Congress has already
enacted much legislation in the area of maritime personal injuries”; for these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to fashion a new admiralty rule). But see
generally Ronneberg, supra note 126, at 6 (“When Congress has statutorily spoken on an issue or rule of admiralty law, the federal courts ‘sail in occupied waters,’ and cannot significantly alter or amend what Congress has legislated.”).
235
See Ronneberg, supra note 126, at 6 (“When, however, Congress has not
spoken, [federal courts are] free to exercise [their] authority to create the legal
standard and rules which [they] deem[] appropriate for navigation and maritime
commerce.”).
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court would have viewed itself as incompetent to fashion a rule answering the rule question. 236 The U.S. Supreme Court in Wilburn
Boat determined that it was incompetent to create a federal admiralty rule because the question it had to answer in fashioning the rule
could yield numerous answers that “involve[d] varied policy considerations.” 237 However, the rule question that the district court in
Rivkees would have faced really could produce only a binary yesor-no answer: yes, a cruise line may include provisions in its passenger contracts requiring passengers to show proof of COVID-19
vaccination before boarding its ships; or no, it may not. Indeed, the
district court seemed to present itself as quite the opposite of incompetent in handling this kind of question: it had a strong understanding of the beneficial impact proof of COVID-19 vaccinations can
have on the sustenance of the cruise industry and the burdens on
interstate commerce that can result from a lack thereof. 238
Having determined its authority to fashion a maritime rule and
having recognized section 381.00316’s burden on interstate commerce and violation of cruise lines’ right to free speech, the district
court would have likely formulated a maritime rule that, regardless
of any state law that dictates to the contrary, such as section
381.00316, cruise lines may require passengers to provide proof of
COVID-19 vaccination to gain access to their ships. 239 Applying
this rule to NCLH, the district court would have ruled that section
381.00316 may not govern NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement and that NCLH may require its passengers to
show proof of COVID-19 vaccination to gain access to its ships.

See generally Goldstein, supra note 230, at 433–35 (discussing how the
U.S. Supreme Court in Wilburn Boat “justified its decision not to fashion a federal
rule on doubts about its competency”).
237
See Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 320; Goldstein, supra note 230, at 433–35
(explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court in Wilburn Boat had “to choose from a
menu of possible rules”).
238
See supra notes 103–120 and accompanying text. See generally Goldstein,
supra note 230, at 433–34 (explaining that Congress indubitably “possesse[s] certain advantages in shaping law as opposed to” federal courts) (“Congress cannot
address all issues.”) (“Courts always must operate within the circumstances a case
presents but this limit does not justify declining to fashion rules to decide disputes.”).
239
See supra notes 103–120, 228–238 and accompanying text.
236
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B. Comparing the Dormant Commerce Clause Claim with an
Admiralty Jurisdiction Claim
A dormant Commerce Clause claim and an admiralty jurisdiction claim overlap to a notable degree. 240 Therefore, this Section discusses the similarities and differences between the two claims and
whether it is worthwhile to bring an admiralty jurisdiction claim in
addition to a dormant Commerce Clause claim.
1. SIMILARITIES
The Pike test of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis and the
Kossick/Norfolk Southern test of the admiralty jurisdiction analysis
both compare federal and local state interests in determining
whether a state law that interferes with a federal interest may govern. 241 Specifically, Pike is concerned with clearly excessive burdens on interstate commerce, 242 and Kossick/Norfolk Southern is
concerned with the defeat of federal interests, namely uniformity in
maritime law and the protection of maritime commerce 243 (a type of
interstate commerce). 244 Therefore, both analyses can be used to determine whether a state law that interferes with maritime commerce
may govern. These similarities suggest that the dormant Commerce
Clause claim in Rivkees functioned essentially the same as an admiralty jurisdiction claim would have functioned. One could say that
an admiralty jurisdiction claim, whether intentionally or not, was already “baked into” NCLH’s dormant Commerce Clause claim.
2. DIFFERENCES
Although both the Pike test and the Kossick/Norfolk Southern
test compare federal interests and local state interests in determining
See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
Compare Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd. v. Rivkees, 553 F. Supp.
3d 1143, 1170 (S.D. Fla. 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-12729 (11th Cir. Aug.
11, 2021) with Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 27 (2004).
242
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. See generally Kassel v. Consol.
Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 668 (1981) (quoting Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Kassel, 475 F. Supp. 544, 551 (S.D. Iowa 1979)) (referring
to “the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences
that seriously impede it”).
243
See Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 25, 27.
244
See supra note 222.
240
241
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whether a state law that interferes with a federal interest may govern,
the Pike test is a balancing test, whereas the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test is a categorical test. 245 The two tests also differ with respect
to whose interests they give preference. Pike’s balancing test gives
preference to state interests by invalidating a state law only if its
burden on the federal interest of interstate commerce clearly exceeds
its local benefits to the state. 246 The Kossick/Norfolk Southern’s categorical test gives preference to federal interests by making paramount the federal interests of uniformity of the maritime law and the
protection of maritime commerce in determining whether conflicting state interests may be accommodated by a state law. 247 Additionally, the Pike test considers whether states could have implemented alternatives that impose smaller, less substantial burdens on
interstate commerce, 248 whereas the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test
does not seem to include such a consideration. 249
3. THE VALUE OF AN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION CLAIM
Because it would have likely succeeded, an admiralty jurisdiction claim in Rivkees would have been worthwhile for NCLH to
make. Firstly, it would have added extra support to NCLH’s challenge to section 381.00316’s governance of its COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement. Secondly, it would have been an
extra line of defense that Dr. Rivkees would need to defeat on appeal. This is important because, for several reasons, it is likely easier
for NCLH to win on an admiralty jurisdiction claim than on a
dormant Commerce Clause claim, even though the two claims are
The words “clearly exceed” from the Pike test denote a balancing process.
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (calling the Pike test a “balancing test”).
Conversely, the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test does not include any language that
denotes a balancing process, but rather an “either/or” determination of whether
“state interests can[] be accommodated without defeating a federal interest” or
not. See Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 27.
246
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
247
See Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 25, 27–29 (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959) (“State law must yield to the needs
of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious
system, but this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope.”).
248
Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
249
See generally Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 18–36; Kossick v. United Fruit
Co., 365 U.S. 731, 731–41 (1961).
245
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functionally similar: the Kossick/Norfolk Southern test’s categorical
requirement that a federal interest be “defeat[ed]” by a state law’s
accommodation of state law interests in order to preclude state law’s
governance is likely less arduous to prove than the Pike test’s requirement that a state law’s burden on interstate commerce “clearly
exceed[]” the local state benefits. 250 While the Kossick/Norfolk
Southern test compares both state and federal interests in determining whether a state law may govern a maritime contract, this determination ultimately depends solely upon whether a federal interest
is defeated, regardless of how much a maritime contract’s interpretation “implicate[s] local interests as to beckon interpretation by
state law.” 251 This is unlike Pike’s balancing test, which ostensibly
requires a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the state and federal
interests at issue to build legitimate support for why one side’s interests outweigh the other’s. 252 In addition, the Kossick/Norfolk
Southern test gives preference to the federal interests of uniformity
of the maritime law and the protection of maritime commerce (both
of which are at stake in Rivkees) 253 in determining whether a state
law may govern a maritime contract, whereas the Pike test gives
preference to state law in making this determination. 254 Therefore,
assuming arguendo that the Eleventh Circuit reverses the district
court’s order with respect to all the claims that NCLH actually made,
the extra claim of admiralty jurisdiction would likely save NCLH on
appeal as to maintain section 381.00316’s inapplicability to
NCLH’s COVID-19 vaccination documentation requirement.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that an admiralty jurisdiction
claim would have succeeded, it might have even been politically advantageous for NCLH to have brought only an admiralty jurisdiction
Compare Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170, with Norfolk Southern, 543
U.S. at 27.
251
Norfolk Southern, 543 U.S. at 27.
252
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (“The Pike balancing test is a factsensitive inquiry.”) (citing multiple other cases that support that the Pike test is
either “fact-sensitive” or “fact-intensive”); Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970) (“If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”).
253
See infra notes 215–222 and accompanying text.
254
See infra Section II.B.2.
250
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claim and no constitutional claims. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis
was passionate in enacting section 381.00316 255––a statute concerning the evidently politicized topic of vaccine passports. 256 Even
though NCLH’s constitutional challenge is as-applied as opposed to
facial, 257 NCLH’s victory on this challenge would open the door for
businesses from other industries within the state to make similar
claims and potentially render the statute obsolete. 258 This could engender political discontent in the Florida government, which could
harm the relationship and future dealings between NCLH and the
Florida government. Presumably, it has not been NCLH’s intention
so much to expose section 381.00316 as wholly unconstitutional and
rustle political feathers as it has been to simply ensure it can operate

See, e.g., Fox News, Ron DeSantis Vows to Fight ‘Vaccine Passport’ Plan,
YOUTUBE, 0:00–0:30 (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
0i76G_fx5-M (Governor DeSantis saying that “[i]t is completely unacceptable for
either the government or the private sector” to require vaccine passports); Forbes
Breaking News, ‘I’m Offended’: DeSantis Lambasts Vaccine Passports,
YOUTUBE, 00:00–0:30, 1:35–1:50 (Sept. 3, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FI30EXdJ6i0 (Governor DeSantis saying that he is “offended” by vaccine passport requirements and does not want a “biomedical security state” that
requires people to show vaccine passports “just to be able to live everyday life”).
256
See, e.g., Allan Smith, Politicization of ‘Vaccine Passports’ Could Aggravate GOP Hesitancy, Experts Warn, NBC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2021, 4:31 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/politicization-vaccine-passports-could-aggravate-gop-hesitancy-experts-warn-n1263048; Max Fisher, Vaccine Passports, Covid’s Next Political Flash Point, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/02/world/europe/passports-covid-vaccine.html. “Vaccine passport” is another way of saying “documentation certifying
COVID-19 vaccination.” Compare What Is a Vaccine Passport?, WEBMD,
https://www.webmd.com/vaccines/covid-19-vaccine/vaccine-passport-covid
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021) (explaining that a vaccine passport is “proof that you’ve
tested negative for or been protected against certain infections”) with FLA. STAT.
§ 381.00316(1) (2021) (referring to “documentation certifying COVID-19 vaccination”).
257
See Rivkees, 553 F. Supp. 3d at 1148 (“NCLH brings this as-applied constitutional challenge . . . .”).
258
Nancy Johnson, Florida Ban on Requiring Vaccine Passports Banned (for
Now), JDSUPRA (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/floridaban-on-requiring-vaccine-7958629/ (“While [Judge Williams’s] opinion is limited to the cruise lines that filed the lawsuit, her reasoning [that] the state cannot
restrict businesses from asking for documented proof of vaccinations is also likely
to be applied in similar circumstances.”).
255
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its fully vaccinated cruises. NCLH’s win on an admiralty jurisdiction claim would essentially create a carveout of section 381.00316
for cruise lines. This win would not implicate the constitutionality
of the statute as applied to other businesses, and would mitigate the
harm, if any, to the relationship between NCLH and the Florida government.
CONCLUSION
This Comment showcases the magic of maritime contracts in
eluding compliance with state law, and how NCLH could have
wielded this magic in eluding compliance with section 381.00316’s
ban on requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination. This Comment
sheds light on a legal loophole that businesses who create and enter
maritime contracts, particularly other cruise lines conducting cruises
out of Florida, can take advantage of to avoid compliance with state
laws that burden their operations. Such a measure can be especially
vital in a commercial environment still entangled in the unpredictable, ever-evolving COVID-19 pandemic. 259

259
See, e.g., What Is a Vaccine Passport?, supra note 256 (explaining how
some business are trying to develop their own digital health passes in response to
varying stances on vaccine passports around the world).

